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THE LIMITS OF BEING "PRESENT AT THE
CREATION"
ROY A. SCHOTLAND"
Jesse Unruh was the first notable commentator on Baker v.
Carr,1 though he was not prone to publish. Soon after the case came
down, I met that legendary figure at a conference on an unrelated
subject. Hearing that I had worked on the case, he didn't hold back:
You damn fools, you think you're helping the cities. The
cities were taking care of themselves; we can work things out
with the agricultural areas-because they don't care what we
do so long as it doesn't interfere with them. But you've
shifted power to the suburbs-all they care about is keeping
taxes down, and that means real trouble.2
Doubtless some observers will persist in believing that the Baker
Court intended to "help the cities." Instead, three convictions
converged, one general and assumed, two specific and explicit. The
first was a sense that courts are capable of dealing with a variety of
problems, and that malapportionment fell within that category. The
second conviction seemed well-established: unless the matter is
beyond judicial competence, the Court will strike irrational official
action as unconstitutional. And Baker's facts must have been
designed by whatever gods preside over change in law: an
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Clerk for Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., O.T. 1961.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. I do not claim to recall his precise words, but his substance and flavor were
unforgettable. Unruh is famous for originating the phrase: "Money is the mother's milk
of politics." Now is the Time for All Good Men, TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44, 44 (quoting
Unruh). He was Speaker of California's Assembly (1961-69) and State Treasurer (1975-
87).
In the original paper by Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One
Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299
(2002), "the suburbs" were merely mentioned; the authors now explain why they do not
expect to explore suburban empowerment. I& at 1317. In addition to the reasons they
note, such exploration is difficult because "the suburbs" embraces so much more than it
did at the time of Baker. Nonetheless, query the completeness of any evaluation that
ignores the relative impacts on urban, suburban, and rural areas. Below, I note other
aspects of their paper that make me reel in admiration for their imaginative, even creative
approach-but with puzzlement about some of their implementation. See infra notes 23-
31 and accompanying text.
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apportionment plan that had not changed since 1901 was bound to be
irrational, or as Justice Clark put it memorably, a "crazy-quilt. '3
Without that patent irrationality, I doubt Justice Stewart would have
cast the fifth vote to reject the Frankfurter position. Justice Clark
brought out the last conviction most plainly: as long as the federal
courthouse door stayed closed to the plaintiffs' claim, they would stay
locked out of the representation to which they were entitled. Indeed,
the fact that all other doors were closed was not the whole cause of
Justice Clark's switching his vote, but was most likely the sine qua
non for his switch.4 Opening the courthouse door was easy in one
regard: making clear that Colegrove v. Green5 was not a precedent. 6
Justice Frankfurter had lacked a majority and had failed to take
advantage of the later opportunities he had to produce a decision
with a full opinion, instead of settling for mere per curiam
affirmances.7 But beyond that simple step, ending the Colegrove era
was hard.8 Richard Hasen, whose command of the literature is
3. 369 U.S. at 253-54 (Clark, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring).
5. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
6. The Court in Colegrove had decided that apportionment was a nonjusticiable
political question; the Frankfurter opinion said that federal courts will not enter this
"political thicket." Id. at 556. Until Baker came down, Colegrove had been treated as not
merely a precedent but a mountainous barrier, although any reader could see it was not
precedent because the opinion lacked a majority, let alone five votes: Justice Frankfurter
had three votes, three Justices had dissented, and the result had been decided by Justice
Rutledge, who wrote that there was a want of equity because it was too late to enjoin use
of the apportionment in an imminent election. Id. at 564-66 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
We learned after Baker came down that Justice Rutledge had voted as he did with
complete, conscious intent to keep the decision from being a precedent: he knew that if
the case was held over and Justice Jackson returned from Nuremberg and Justice Vinson
filled the then-vacant seat, Justice Frankfurter would have five votes. Justice Rutledge
hoped that a later Court would be readier, facing a mere 3-1-3, to open the courthouse
door, as his opinion so subtly urged. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL
WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT 410-11 (1983). Justice Rutledge is the unsung hero
of the reapportionment revolution.
7. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-09 n.29 (citing nine per curiam decisions).
Frankfurter's failure to take advantage of those opportunities is particularly striking for
him: as a professor, it was he who had initiated scholarship about the Court.
8. See Richard Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially Unmanageable" Standards in
Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1477, 1483 n.22 (2002)
(citing sources).
Nor should we ever overlook how hard it may have been to get agreement to an
opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), on state legislative districting. For
brevity on that, we should note for students that Reynolds was argued a week before
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (invalidating a congressional districting statute),
but not decided until four months after.
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unmatched, recently noted with surprise just how hard overturning
Colegrove had been.9
I hesitate to write about Baker at all because of an inescapable
bias and a fear that any words of defense will be misread as meaning I
think the Baker opinions flawless. Of course I do not think that.
Great artists give us unflawed work, or at least work in which any
flaws do not matter--or, what we mortals see as flaws, are not.'0
Opinions do not rise to that level.
Having been invited late to this Symposium and having read
fewer than all essays, I offer, (with deep appreciation for the
invitation), only mini-comments on three of the many valuable
contributions: the essays by Professors Persily," Hasen,'2  and
Gerken.13 But first, at risk of pedantry, may I suggest changing the
Symposium's title to something like "Baker and its Progeny .... (or
"Baker, doughnuts, and holes"?). Most of the treatment seems to be
about the progeny, as surely it should be. While of course everyone
knows how far Baker went, what Reynolds did, and what was not
done until after Reynolds, much of the treatment unduly merges
reapportionment with districting, and "rigidity" with one person, one
vote. 4 The development from Baker to Reynolds and after is a rich
9. E-mail from Richard Hasen, Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow,
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles), Roy Schotland (Feb. 20, 2000, 10:56:36 PST) (on file
with North Carolina Law Review).
10. Classicists writing about "flaws" in Aeschylus drew this comment:
[S]uch criticisms prove only one thing, that those who make them have not fully
understood what is going on. We expect one thing; Aeschylus gives us another.
He needs no indulgence. He could write for the theater as intelligently as any
dramatist and more powerfully than most. All we have to do is to understand
what he thought his plays were about; then everything becomes clear ....
H.D.F. Krrro, GREEK TRAGEDY 65 (3d ed. 1970).
11. Persily et al., supra note 2.
12. Hasen, supra note 8.
13. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker
v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411 (2002).
Also, two words of applause for Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A
Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1269 (2002). First, every time I teach Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), I attack Justice White's treatment of "virtual"
representation, though I would have voted -with him. Levinson capsulizes the attack better
than I have seen, and I hope I will not be the only person always quoting him. Levinson,
supra, at 1293-94. Second, I add this to Levinson's words of concern, id. at 1293-94, about
under-representation of children: "On the day that Nelson Mandela was elected President
of South Africa, my husband and I happily told our eight-year-old son Robert that this,
indeed, was a day for celebration. At last, everyone in South Africa could vote. Without
hesitation, Robert asked, 'Can the children vote, too?'" Suellyn Scarnecchia, Imagining
Children's Rights, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1,1 (1995).
14. There is no doubt as to the authors' awareness and intent, so perhaps I misread
some of the phrasing. For example, Persily, when he writes, "One person, one vote, it was
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example of what happens when courts grapple with the political
process, and we ought not blur the steps of that development.
Before commenting on the three papers, I comment (fully aware
of the risk of being defensive) on one criticism of the Baker opinions
that seems to me literally nonsense, that is, having no sense of reality.
I seek to bring out the ease of criticizing and the difficulty of deciding.
For example, Michael McConnell (who knows better, having clerked
for Justice Brennan) wrote awhile ago that Baker should have rested
not on equal protection grounds, but rather on republican form of
government grounds." However, that alternative would have
brought a head-on confrontation with Luther v. Borden6 and Pacific
thought, would help prevent partisan gerrymandering," seems to suggest the Justices are
other-worldly. Compare Persily et al., supra note 2, at 1317, with Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, 748-49 (1973) ("An unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, a
mere nose count... may submerge [the] other considerations and itself furnish a ready
tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an acceptable
representation and apportionment arrangement."), and Persily et al., supra note 2, at 1332
("[Did] Baker and its progeny [lead] to greater changes .... .") (emphasis added). Note
that Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 754, 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting). I cannot avoid
querying his dissent here and with the pages in Reynolds noted below.
There is also no doubt that Reynolds is too often not remembered as it was
written. For example, Professor Hasen notes that "the Court left the states with just a bit
of wiggle room," and he quotes two sentences that are left out of his casebook's current
and prior editions. Hasen, supra note 8, at 1479; see DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN &
RICHARD HASEN, ELECTION LAW 116 (2d ed. 2001); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN,
ELECTION LAW 74 (1st ed. 1995). Also omitted are the opinion's two pages before those
two sentences-pages that give much more than "just a bit of wiggle room." For example:
Somewhat more flexibility may therefore be constitutionally permissible with
respect to state legislative apportionment than in congressional districting.
Lower courts can and assuredly will work out more concrete and specific
standards for evaluating state legislative apportionment schemes in the context of
actual litigation. For the present, we deem it expedient not to attempt to spell
out any precise constitutional tests. What is marginally permissible in one State
may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of
the case. Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case basis appears to us to
provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed constitutional
requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment. Thus, we proceed to
state there only a few rather general considerations which appear to us to be
relevant ....
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted).
15. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 106 (2000) ("As an interpretation of the
political question doctrine, this [for example, '"judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar," and thus do not present justiciability
problems'] was nonsense."). He uses the word nonsense to express disagreement, even
disdain; I use it both that way and also literally.
16. 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849) (holding that enforcing the Republican Form of Government
Clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, presents a political question).
PRESENT AT THE CREATION
States v. Oregon.7 Even if one saw advantages in that alternative (I
do nota"), the reality was that Justice Stewart at that time was
absolutely unwilling to overrule any precedent-and though Baker
ended 6-2, it never would have reached that point but for Justice
Stewart's making it 5-4 against the Frankfurter position. 9 "Had the
17. 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (holding that whether citizen-initiated ballot propositions
violated the Republican Form of Government Clause presented a political question).
18. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker argued that the equal protection claim was
"in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label." 369 U.S. 186,
297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But as Carl Auerbach pointed out immediately
after Reynolds, "to rest the Reapportionment Cases on the Guarantee Clause creates
difficulties of its own." Carl Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One
Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 85.
19. See Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV.
29,32 (1997). Professor Pushaw, like Professor McConnell, is in denial about the fact that
a majority opinion might be crafted to be supported by a majority, and that one of the
majority might refuse to join "unless"; here, "unless" was that no precedent was overruled.
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the
Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2002). Pushaw
admits that for fifty years the Court had made decisions creating a blanket political
question prohibition-precedent that included challenges to state apportionments. Id. at
1168-69. He says that starting with Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 118, those decisions had
"misconstrued" Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. at 42; evidently he is so sure that those decisions
erred that he cannot imagine Justice Stewart could miss the error-or be unwilling to
overrule fifty years of decisions. Pushaw even accuses Brennan of "intellectual
dishonesty," Pushaw, supra at 1175 n.60, because Brennan failed to see the cases as
Pushaw does.
Pushaw's own limitations in reading cases should cool his aggressiveness. I offer
three examples. First, he attacks every opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), for the
tiny point that they failed to cite Baker. Pushaw, supra, at 1167 n.7. I agree that they
should have, but one cannot overlook the time constraints on that decision, and more
importantly, one should not overlook the opinions' truly interesting omission about the
political question issue: The opinions made much of McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1
(1892), the principal precedent about Article II. See 531 U.S. at 104 (per curiam); id. at
113 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring); id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But they wholly
ignored that McPherson's opening page addressed the political question, albeit summarily.
146 U.S. at 23-24. Second, he attacks U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), for rejecting
"Nixon's argument for nonjusticiability [which] had strong support in Article II and in
practice" without noting the Court's explicit emphasis on a key distinction: "The
impediment that an absolute, unqualified [executive] privilege would place in the way of
the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions ... under Article III." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707; Pushaw, supra, at 1183 n.113.
Third, he attacks LN.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative vetoes
unconstitutional), as inconsistent with venerable precedent to the contrary, Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892) (refusing to allow a party to question the assurance by Congress and
the President that a federal statute had been properly authenticated and enrolled).
Pushaw, supra, at 1182 nn.108-10. Whatever one's view of those cases, I marvel that
anyone could fail to see the distinction between the old case that involved only the finality
of official representations that the steps required to enact a law had been completed, and
Chadha, involving Congress's assertion that, without completing the steps of the enactment
process, it could control executive branch action just as if it had completed the steps. The
older case involved nothing but the finality of official representations, but Chadha
2002] 1509
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litigation proceeded under the Republican Form of Government
Clause," writes McConnell, "it would have been quite different."20
Different indeed: either no litigation at all, or not until-and
unless-Justices came along willing to overrule what would, by then,
have been a potent precedent "counter-Baker."
A second comment goes to much criticism of Baker and similar
cases: of course it is far easier to open the door than to design the
new domain. But should we never open such doors unless the design
is in hand? Is Martin Shapiro all wrong when he writes that "judges
... are often in a position to identify a wrong without being able to
define the right"?21
involved both aggrandizement of Congress's power and encroachment on the executive.
See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
138-39 (9th ed. 1995).
Last, he attacks Baker for "jettisoning federalism." Pushaw, supra, at 1172 n.79.
True, Baker thrust federal judicial power into core state affairs. But that strengthened
federalism:
Although there has been a continuing debate over the actual impact of
reapportionment, it is obvious that urban areas had not been granted their fair
share of legislative representation.... Increased urban representation naturally
has led to a growing responsiveness on the part of state legislatures to the
problems and interests of the cities and suburbs, which in turn has encouraged
the national government to break some of the direct Washington-local
government ties that originally had been justified by anti-urban legislatures....
The states can no longer be considered the weak links of the federal system.
Indeed, they have become the new heroes of American federalism ....
ANN O'M. BOWMAN & RICHARD C. KEARNEY, THE RESURGENCE OF THE STATES 17,
40 (1986); see also id. at 2, 7 (" 'The states, in short, assumed a new relevance in the federal
matrix.' "); id. at 13,104; DAVID WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM 249-83 (1995);
Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural
Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 520-21 (1998). See generally
American Federalism: The Third Century, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
(1990) (providing an overview of events of American Federalism since 1974 that have set
the stage for the most ambitious experiment in democratic self-government); see also
generally infra note 27 (discussing comments of Abner Mikva).
20. McConnell, supra note 15, at 114.
21. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 227, 228 (1985). Justice Brennan's former colleagues, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in 1960, unanimously agreed to take jurisdiction over reapportionment of the
legislature. Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 161 A.2d 705, 716 (1960). Plaintiffs had
sought an order declaring the existing apportionment (which was still pursuant to a 1941
statute, although the 1950 census had shown "substantial... changes") a violation of the
state constitutional provision that required reapportioning among the counties after each
census, "as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants." Id. at 707.
The court dismissed Colegrove simply: "[T]here no mandatory requirement of a state
constitution for apportionment was involved." Id. at 710. The court listed decisions in
fifteen states, going back into the nineteenth century, in which "the responsibility has been
accepted," and cited an Oklahoma decision that had noted twenty-two such states as of
1938, with none contrary. Id. at 711. In 1956, Tennessee's high court had decided against
"accepting the responsibility"-which made the Baker situation such a total lock-up. Kidd
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Having made these pleas to be realistic, I now offer comments on
three other contributions to this Symposium. On the Persily paper, I
have a few questions about the exploration of life without Baker.
First, Persily writes, "Forty years after Baker v. Carr, we have
finally begun to understand the early political effects of [one-person,
one-vote]."' 2 If that is so and if what emerges from analyses is so
often a hodge-podge (as Persily and his co-authors labeled it), does
this suggest that Chief Justice Warren-whom the paper so rightly
quotes at its opening-was right or wrong? Or is the position like
Chou En-Lai's when asked what he thought of the French
Revolution: "It's too early to say?"
Second, how right or wrong was Jesse Unruh? As noted above,2
examination is needed, rather than mere passing mention of how "the
suburbs" fared.
Third, as I said earlier,24 the Persily effort to explore what I call
"counter-Baker" is, for me, excitingly imaginative and potentially
significant. I hope that the continuing work on this will examine
more than the partisan impacts because, as the Essay notes, there are
"two distinct ideas... partisan bias and electoral responsiveness."25
Fourth, must not any consideration of "What if Baker never
happened?" consider other kinds of impacts on state government and
on federalism? 26
v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 235, and finding
"its holding rested on its state law of remedies").
The New Jersey court, because the 1960 census data would soon be available,
"with[e]Ild determination of the various problems presented (except, of course, that of our
jurisdiction to hear the matter), in order that the Legislature may have an opportunity to
consider adoption of a reapportionment act ... ." Asbury Park, 161 A.2d at 715. There
can be no question that Justice Brennan was aware of that decision, but I do not recall
discussion about it (although I had worked on it as a summer clerk for plaintiffs' counsel).
Thus, one could say that the New Jersey court led the way for Baker, a striking
instance of state court independence, which Justice Brennan later so forcefully
encouraged. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489,502 (1977) (arguing that the trend of then-recent
Supreme Court civil liberties decisions should prompt a reappraisal of the strategy of
litigants not to rest such claims on state constitutional guarantees).
22. Persily et al., supra note 2 at 1351.
23. See supra note 2.
24. See supra note 2.
25. Persily et al., supra note 2, at 1318. It might be interesting to revisit the survey of
204 state officials published in 1952. Charles W. Shull, Political and Partisan Implications
of State Legislative Apportionment, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 417,430-39 (1952).
26. Malapportionment was blamed for much of the "near eclipse of state
government," in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations by their Advisory
Commissions on Intergovernmental Relations. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 49. Please
forgive me for quoting myself: "Baker v. Carr ended an era in which the states had been
2002] 1511
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Fifth, given that, as the Essay indicates, Baker may be called in
many respects "the mother of all political process cases, ' must not
one consider the impact on law outside districting? 28 For example, is
Abner Mikva wrong about Baker's ability to claim the Voting Rights
Act ("VRA") as part of its progeny?29 And if there were no Baker-
which means in its place, a continued political question barrier to such
matters-would the federal courts have been available to Congress to
help implement the VRA?30
The Hasen Essay makes a point that cannot be over-emphasized,
in his imaginative "homage to judicial unmanageability" and
affirmation of the value in uncertainty and experimentation. 31  I
believe that is exactly what Reynolds called for, explicitly even if not
as engagingly as Hasen.32 As I read Reynolds, it sent Hasen's
"scouts" off on fruitfully different paths. I believe that openness to
so unresponsive to so many of their people that federalism was not working-because only
Washington was responsive. For the vigor of our states today, and therefore of our federal
system, thank Brennan." Roy Schotland, Presentation in Panel, Remembering a
Constitutional Hero, Remembering and Advancing the Constitutional Vision of Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 13, 22, 24 (1999). I there paraphrased
Abner Mikva (who confirmed this paraphrase) on how much difference Baker made in
state government:
How much today's vigor of state governments owes to the reapportionment
revolution is clear only when one recalls how limp those governments had been.
The scene, even in as major a state as Illinois, was memorably captured by Judge
Abner Mikva, describing his time as a legislator. He used to say that the hardest
decisions he had to make as a state legislator came every Sunday night, when he
had to decide what to pack to take to Springfield. Since he had no office at the
state capitol, not even a desk with a lock, he'd have to carry there and back
everything he expected to be working on.
Id at 24 n.31.
27. Persily, supra note 2, at 1302.
28. Cf. Alan B. Morrison, What if ... Buckley were Overturned?, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 347,348 (1999) (examining the changes that would occur in First Amendment
jurisprudence outside the context of campaign finance, if Buckley were overruled).
29. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of
Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 686-87.
30. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891,944 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that the federal courts should not be available for Voting Rights Act districting cases
because such matters are mired in politics).
31. Hasen, supra note 8, at 1485. Hasen persuasively praises the usually condemned
attribute of "judicial unmanageability" and later urges that
[w]hen unsure of the correct direction, the leader's best strategy might be to...
send a few scouts out along different paths.... The leader, after receiving
[information], can then make a more informed decision on the ultimate path to
be taken. If the Court, as is likely, will remain in the political thicket,
unmanageability may be one of the best tools available for finding the right
paths.
Id. at 1503.
32. See supra note 8.
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experimentation should have prevailed in, for example, California
Democratic Party v. Jones.33 And such openness is the keystone of
the opinion that I wish had prevailed in Justice Souter's dissent in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.' If the courts pick up only
two points in this Symposium, I hope they will be Hasen's and
Gerken's?5
Last, Gerken here,36 and previously,37 brilliantly recasts our
approach to Baker and so much more than Baker by bringing out the
reality and the potentially great gains of looking upon districting cases
as involving not ordinary individual rights, but "aggregate" rights.38
But on one point unnecessary to Gerken's work, I disagree with her.
She refers repeatedly to "the Court's failure. ' 39  If there was a
failure-and I do not agree that there was-was it the Court or was it
the bar and academe? How much of the scholarship about these
cases has included any look at the briefs and oral argument? Almost
33. 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000). The Court in Jones protected the party leaderships, even
the major parties', from the political process that the party leaders were unwilling to risk.
They avoided the ballot proposition effort in which majorities of both major parties voted
for the blanket primary; they avoided the legislature. Instead, they sought judicial
intervention to stop the political process.
Perhaps the parties would have found ways to avoid injury from the blanket
primary, or would have found that there was less injury than gain, or would have
discovered that, like the parties in Washington and Alaska, this process was survivable.
When majorities beat up minorities, judicial relief is needed. When majorities disagree
with the party leaders' concept of parties and the party leaders' attitude toward turn-out-
well, query.
34. 520 U.S. 351, 382-84 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no need
for the majority's "'preservation of the two-party system' rationale" until there is some
showing that fusion candidacies pose a substantial threat to that system).
35. For Hasen's point, see supra note 31. Gerken's point, infra note 36, is about the
need for the Court to become more realistic about the limitations of its "individual-rights
framework." Gerken, supra note 13, at 1463.
36. Gerken, supra note 13,passim.
37. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L.
REV. 1663,1667 (2001).
38. Her work is exemplary because it can-and, I hope, will-help courts decide
future cases. Such work is the opposite of what, decades ago, Fred Rodell described as
typical of legal decisions and legal writing: "The law is the Killy-loo bird [which] insisted
on flying backward because it didn't care where it was going but was mightily interested in
where it had been." FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! 20 (Pageant-Poseidon
Ltd. 1972) (1939).
For example: Do any of the papers in this Symposium deal with how, in the new
circumstances of the post-2000 districting, "retrogression" should be treated? A superb
picture of the first notable post-2000 case is given by counsel for the defense. See Sam
Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New
Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002). Might not this Symposium be less "Commemorative"
and more celebratory if we attend more to the districting decisions that lie ahead?
39. Gerken, supra note 13, at 1418, 1466.
2002] 1513
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no help was available to the Baker Court. The lower court had
written a helpful opinion-a plea to end the Colegrove barrier."n
Participating as an amicus, Solicitor General Cox, a convert to the
cause, added value. But the plaintiffs offered little beyond rhetoric,
and as I note in the next paragraph, academe had all but completely
ignored this subject.
The best writing, nearly the only writing, was an article by that
unique (but then new) media authority on the Court, Anthony
Lewis.41 My point is not to criticize criticizing Baker, but to ask about
what we scholars produce ... and fail to produce. Even between
Baker and Reynolds, scholars were silent or all but. Judges never
have as much time for this or that aspect of a case as scholars can
take, judges sometimes have less analytic ability than scholars, and
judges rarely have layers of scholarship on which to build-especially
when new domains are being opened. All of us, including judges,
cultivate our gardens, but we ought to be more hesitant about putting
down other people's seeming weeds.
In closing, I share two episodes, one from the day Baker came
down, another from five years later. First, the dissenters didn't
merely disagree, they believed that this door-opening would lead the
federal courts to disaster-an inescapable politicization that would
spread and undermine the federal courts' integrity, appearance of
integrity, and thus the role of the third branch in constitutional law.
That morning, Justice Harlan wore a black tie and looked so
despondent that at robing before going on the bench, Justice
Frankfurter (who had more experience with losing) and Justice
Douglas tried to cheer him up-Justice Frankfurter saying, "John, it's
not the end of the world." In the courtroom to hear the reading of
the opinions was a friend of Justice Harlan friend who had known
him since their elementary school days, and who said that she had
40. 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.C. Tenn. 1959) ("In view of this array of decisions by our
highest court, charting the unmistakable course which this court must pursue in the instant
case, it is unnecessary to consider the decisions by lower federal courts. It is significant to
point out.. . Kidd v. McCanless .. "); see also supra note 6 (discussing Colegrove).
41. Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L.
REV. 1057, 1095-98 (1958) (arguing that Supreme Court action was the only effective
means to correct malapportionment). In 1929, Zechariah Chafee wrote Congressional
Reapportionment, 42 HARV. L. REv. 1015, 1031 (1929), which outlines the importance of
congressional apportionment, the potential legal remedies for congressional failure to
reapportion, and the best methods to produce equitable reapportionment. If there was
other writing, it was not significant.
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never seen him looking so ghastly. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
meant it about the lack of judicially manageable standards.42
Standards are essential for all judicial action, although if we
decide obscenity cases with analysis like "I know it when I see it,"43
we do not jeopardize the judiciary. In contrast, if judicial review of
districting suffers standardless subjectivity, there is danger that
subjectivity degenerates to partisan preference; and if the courts are
in fact or are justifiably seen as partisan, then their ability to perform
their highest role is endangered.4
The second episode captures a reaction to that fear in 1967. That
spring, Harvard Law School had invited Justice Brennan to a full
pomp-and-ceremony celebration of his ten years on the Court.
People who are not "old-fashioned scholars [from] prior
generations" 45 cannot feel (I choose the word deliberately) how deep
and bitter was the hostility, even contempt, at Harvard and other
schools-where Justice Frankfurter was the god-toward Chief
Justice Warren and his close colleagues.46 When Harvard invited
Justice Brennan, one of his colleagues (not the Chief) urged him not
42. "[We will get into great difficulty and this Court will rue the results." THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 845 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (quoting
Justice Frankfurter in the Court's conference in April 1961, after the first argument).
Justice Frankfurter also said in a note to Justice Stewart when the case was
reargued that "the evil genii [were about] to be released by the decision." SCHWARTZ,
supra note 7, at 424. And "Harlan, usually the most restrained of the Brethren, argued
with intense emotion .... " IL at 416.
As Carl Auerbach wrote in 1964, "I share Professor McCloskey's view that 'the
Court's future as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave doubt' if the 'public
should ever become convinced that.., judicial review is only a euphemism for an
additional layer in the legislative process.' " Auerbach, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting
Robert McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reapportionment
Cases, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54,67 (1962)).
43. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. I am indebted to Guy-Uriel Charles for a discussion that helped sharpen this
point. For Professor Charles's contribution to this Symposium, see Guy-Uriel Charles,
Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach
of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
45. Mark Tushnet's delightful description fits me. I share his approach to political
questions; on that, I find Samuel Issacharoff's treatment of Bush v. Gore dispositive.
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001). I fear I disagree
with my colleague Tushnet's view on Bush's standing; I treat that issue in teaching
materials on the case, and further in a forthcoming piece. R.A. Schotland, What Ever
Happened to Due Process?, 34 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2002); Bush v. Gore:
Law, or Statesmanship, or Abuse (2001) (R.A. Schotland teaching materials for Election
Law) (on file with author).
46. I remember hearing that the University of Chicago Law School's outstanding Phil
Kurland, encountering the Chief Justice at some event, had pointedly turned his back on
him. I have no idea whether that did happen, but the existence of the tale says enough.
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to go. But Justice Brennan being Justice Brennan, went. The
highlight of that day was a talk by Dean Erwin Griswold (a High
Priest), who said in substance: "In Baker, we thought you'd taken on
what could not succeed, but to our surprise you've brought it off, and
there's no denying that it is a great achievement. We all applaud you
for it."47
47. Again, I make no claim to recall his precise words, but the substance and flavor
were unforgettable.
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